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I. Introduction 
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a complicated and 
“emerging norm”1 of international law that seeks to provide a means 
for the international community to prevent mass atrocity crimes 
occurring within the boundaries of a sovereign state.2 Since its 
emergence in 2001, in the wake of humanitarian tragedies in Bosnia, 
Rwanda, Kosovo, and Darfur, R2P has been hailed as a way of 
resolving what one commentator called the “problem from hell.”3 
Under R2P, however, the use of force is reserved for actions within 
the UN Charter’s Chapter VII framework. As the Syria crisis has 
demonstrated, this position continues to hinder efforts by the 
international community to protect populations from mass atrocity 
crimes.  
This article argues that when peaceful measures have been 
exhausted and the Security Council is deadlocked, R2P’s third pillar 
should allow the use of only those low-intensity military options, such 
as no-fly zones and humanitarian safe havens, that are focused on 
protecting populations. This approach would advance R2P’s 
development by establishing specific criteria that allow for the limited 
use of force when the Security Council fails to act. In doing so, R2P 
will be able to fulfill its primary purpose of preventing mass atrocities 
within a sovereign state, thus preventing humanitarian tragedies 
similar to those witnessed in Bosnia, Rwanda, Darfur, and now Syria.  
At the time of writing, attacks by Syrian government forces and 
militias have killed upward of 75,000 civilians, and approximately 
1. The Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and 
Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, ¶ 203, U.N. 
Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2004) (describing the Responsibility to Protect as 
an “emerging norm”) [hereinafter A More Secure World]. See also S.C. 
Res. 1674, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006) (“Reaffirm[ing] the 
provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity[.]”). Notably, this resolution was ultimately supported by 
Russia and China, each of whom had initially expressed reservations 
about the implications of R2P for state sovereignty. 
2. The international community’s ultimate response to the Syria crisis will 
contribute to the shape of R2P.  
3. SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF 
GENOCIDE (2003). 
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1,000,000 refugees have fled into neighboring states.4 The 
international community has tried to resolve the Syria crisis through 
diplomatic overtures and sanctions, but its attempts have been 
unsuccessful. Although the UN Human Rights Council has concluded 
that Syria’s humanitarian crisis is being driven by a “state policy” of 
deliberate attacks against civilians,5 military intervention by the 
Security Council has not been forthcoming.  
Russia and China oppose any coercive measures against Syria, 
with Russia contending that the international community should 
“strictly adhere to the norms of international law. . . .”6 While 
Russia’s opposition is likely grounded in their strategic self-interest,7 
some states remain concerned that humanitarian action “could be 
abused by powerful states as justification for interventions that serve 
their political interests.”8 Given the Security Council’s ineffectiveness 
4. William Hague, Foreign Secretary, Statement to Parliament on Syria 
(Mar. 6, 2013), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/ 
 foreign-secretary-statement-to-parliament-on-syria. See also Syria 
Regional Refugee Response, UN High Comm’n on Refugees, 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php (last visited Mar. 26, 
2013).  
5. See Independent International Commission of Inquiry, Report of the 
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab 
Republic, ¶¶ 50, 57, U.N. Doc. A/HCR/21/50 (Aug. 16, 2012) 
[hereinafter Report on Syrian Arab Republic], available at http://www. 
ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session21/
A-HRC-21-50_en.pdf. 
6. Syria Crisis: Russia Warns Obama Against ‘Violation’ of International 
Law, NBC, Aug. 22, 2012, http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012 
/08/22/13409128-syria-crisis-russia-warns-obama-against-violation-of-
international-law?lite.  
7. See, e.g., Christopher Harmer, Russian Naval Base Tartus, INST. FOR 
THE STUDY OF WAR (July 31, 2012), http://www.understandingwar. 
org/backgrounder/russian-naval-base-tartus (explaining the strategic 
significance of Russia’s naval base at Tartus).  
8. Christoph Mikulaschek, The United Nations Security Council and the 
Responsibility to Protect: Policy, Process, and Practice. Report from 
the 39th International Peace Institute Vienna Seminar on Peacemaking 
and Peacekeeping, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 20, 24 (2010), available at http://www.ipac 
ademy.org/media/pdf/publications/favorita_paper_2010.pdf. For a 
Chinese perspective on R2P in Syria, see Qu Xing, The UN Charter, the 
Responsibility to Protect, and the Syria Issue, CHINA INST. OF INT’L 
STUD., (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2012-04/16/con 
tent_4943041.htm. In response to the Syria crisis, other states, led by 
Brazil, have proposed an alternative doctrine called the Responsibility 
While Protecting (RWP), which holds that refining the criteria for the 
legitimate use of coercive force will encourage the Security Council to 
act decisively to prevent mass atrocity crimes. See U.N. General 
Assembly, Letter dated Nov. 9, 2011from the Permanent Representative 
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in the Syria crisis, some commentators have argued that R2P 
advocates must either “mobilize a coalition of the willing” to 
intervene in Syria or “let R2P . . . rest in peace.”9 Others have called 
for reform of the Security Council where mass atrocity crimes are at 
issue.10  
The Syria crisis highlights the current limitations of the R2P 
doctrine. Despite R2P’s important contributions to the protection of 
populations over the past decade, the Security Council’s veto system 
can still create situations where states can commit mass atrocity 
crimes against their citizens. At present, R2P lacks a framework for 
the limited use of force when the Security Council fails to act. In its 
present formulation, therefore, R2P is missing a crucial component.  
This article first provides a background to R2P, discussing the 
debate surrounding the legality of “the right of humanitarian 
intervention.” It then discusses the emergence of R2P, providing an 
overview of R2P’s third pillar, which authorizes the use of force. This 
article then continues to argue that R2P’s third pillar should provide 
for the limited use of force without Security Council authorization.  
Since any use of force outside the Security Council would be at 
the limits of international law, this article sets forth specific criteria 
that must be satisfied before the international community could act 
under R2P’s third pillar: (1) a prima facie case must be established; 
(2) peaceful options must be exhausted; (3) the Security Council must 
be unable to act; (4) any military force used must be limited to low-
intensity options designed to protect populations; (5) the use of low-
intensity military force must be authorized by a legitimate authority; 
and (6) the intervention must come at the request of credible 
opposition groups. Although the use of force without Security Council 
authorization is a complicated and delicate question, this article 
argues that these criteria are the most appropriate way to develop 
R2P moving forward.  
of Brazil to the United Nations Maria L. R. Viotti addressed to the 
Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/66/551–S/2011/701 (Nov. 11, 2011).  
9. Stewart M. Patrick, RIP for R2P? Syria and the Dilemmas of 
Humanitarian Intervention, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (June 12, 
2012),jhttp://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2012/06/12/rip-for-r2p-syria-and-the-
dilemmas-of-humanitarian-intervention/.  
10. See Ben Sharples, New Zealand Wants Security Council Veto Change 
Amid Syria Crisis, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 30, 2012, http:// 
www.businessweek.com/news/2012-09-29/new-zealand-wants-security-
council-veto-change-amid-syria-crisis. 
476 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012 
Preventing Mass Atrocity Crimes 
II. Background to the Responsibility to Protect 
Doctrine 
R2P was born out of the humanitarian tragedies of the 1990s and 
the international community’s disagreements as to whether 
international law recognized a “right of humanitarian intervention,” 
in effect a right to use force for the purposes of preventing mass 
human rights abuses.11 Although the protection and promotion of 
human rights featured as one of the United Nations’ principal 
purposes,12 the UN Charter both generally prohibited the use of 
force13 and guaranteed a state’s right to be free from intervention, 
except for measures authorized by the Security Council under its 
Chapter VII powers or through state actions taken in self-defense.14  
The tension created by the competing concerns of human rights 
and national sovereignty led to uncertainty about how far the 
international community could go to intervene in a sovereign state in 
the face of major human rights violations. Questions arose regarding 
whether the Security Council had the authority to intervene in 
matters that were wholly within the borders of a state, and whether, 
barring Security Council action or a valid claim of self-defense, other 
states could lawfully take action to stop mass human rights 
violations.15 As a result, the international community’s ability to 
11. See INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: REPORT OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
VII (2001) [hereinafter ICISS REPORT], available at http://responsib 
ilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf. Humanitarian intervention is 
defined as “the question of when, if ever, it is appropriate for states to 
take coercive – and in particular military – action, against another state 
for the purposes of protecting people at risk in that other state.” 
12. See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3 (“To achieve international cooperation 
in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or 
humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
discrimination as to race, sex, language, or religion.”). 
13. See id. art. 2, para. 4 (prohibiting the use of force against sovereign 
states). 
14. See id. art. 2 para. 7 (“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall 
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require 
the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present 
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”); id. art. 51 (“Nothing in the 
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defence. . . .”). 
15. Christopher C. Joyner, “The Responsibility to Protect”: Humanitarian 
Concern and the Lawfulness of Armed Intervention, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 
693, 702–03 (2007).  
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prevent mass atrocities was handicapped.16 This situation not only led 
to the death of nearly one million in Bosnia and Rwanda,17 but also 
NATO’s controversial (but legitimate)18 military intervention to 
prevent mass human rights abuses in Kosovo.  
A. Kosovo  
In 1998, Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević commenced 
attacks on ethnic Albanian civilians as part of a campaign against the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).19 At first, the Security Council 
responded to the human rights violations with Resolution 1199.20 In 
this resolution, the Security Council labeled the situation in Kosovo a 
threat to “peace and security.”21 The Security Council also adopted 
provisional measures that demanded the parties cease hostilities and 
take steps toward a conciliatory dialogue.22 In the months that 
followed, as President Milošević continued to order attacks on 
civilians and civilian-populated areas, it became apparent that 
stronger measures would be required to end the mass human rights 
abuses.23 The Security Council, however, failed to authorize further 
coercive measures to prevent mass atrocities. 
Facing a deadlocked Security in March 1999, NATO conducted 
Operation Allied Force, a seventy-seven day campaign of air strikes 
that ended the conflict in Kosovo.24 The campaign was launched 
following numerous failed diplomatic efforts by NATO, the UN, and 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 
The mission’s aim was to disable Serbia’s military capacity to attack 
Kosovar Albanians.25 It included contributions from all nineteen 
NATO member states, and ended with the agreement of Serbia to 
16. See id. at 694, 698–700, 704.  
17. See id.  
18. See generally INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON KOSOVO, 
KOSOVO REPORT (2000) [hereinafter KOSOVO REPORT], available at 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/F62789D9FCC56
FB3C1256C1700303E3B-thekosovoreport.htm. 
19. Id. 
20. S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (Sep. 23, 1998).  
21. See id. pmbl. 
22. See generally id. 
23. See KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 18.  
24. See NATO’s Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo, NATO (July 
15, 1999), http://nato.int/kosovo/history.htm. 
25. U.S. Department of Defense, Operation Allied Force (June 21, 1999), 
available at http://www.defense.gov/specials/kosovo/. 
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cease hostile actions and to withdraw its military forces and political 
apparatus from Kosovo.26  
B. The Right of Humanitarian Intervention  
At the Security Council in March 1999, the United Kingdom 
justified its actions in Kosovo on the doctrine of “humanitarian 
intervention.”27 The United Kingdom argued that an exception to the 
UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force had emerged that 
allowed states to use force, only for the purposes of preventing mass 
human rights abuses, when: (1) there is convincing evidence of 
extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale that requires 
immediate urgent relief; (2) it is objectively clear that there is no 
practicable alternative to the use of force if lives are to be saved; and 
(3) the proposed use of force is necessary and proportionate to the 
aim of humanitarian intervention.28 Importantly, the United Kingdom 
asserted that the right of humanitarian intervention legally justified 
military intervention without explicit Security Council 
authorization.29 
NATO’s actions in Kosovo, though ultimately regarded as 
legitimate,30 were at the time highly controversial. Those opposing the 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention, as proposed by the United 
Kingdom, often argued it could not be considered customary 
international law as it lacked sufficient basis in state practice and 
opinio juris.31 These individuals noted that claims of humanitarian 
intervention were made on a selective basis and that many instances 
of state practice relied upon to support such a right were justified on 
the basis of self-defense and not a right of humanitarian 
intervention.32 Detractors also argued that humanitarian intervention 
without explicit Security Council authorization was an illegitimate 
26. See id.; Rand Corporation, Operation Allied Force: Lessons for Future 
Coalition Operations (Research Brief 72-AF, 2001), available at 
http://www.rand .org/pubs/research_briefs/RB72/index1.html.  
27. Sir Christopher Greenwood, Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of 
Kosovo, 10 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 141, 157 (2002).  
28. For a detailed discussion of the United Kingdom’s legal argument, see 
id. at 157–60.  
29. See id. at 157.  
30. See KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 18 (“The Commission concludes that 
the NATO military intervention was illegal but legitimate.”). 
31. J. L. Holzgrefe, The Humanitarian Intervention Debate, in 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL 
DILEMMAS 46 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane eds., 2003) (“In 
support of this contention, they point to the highly selective exercise of 
the right of unauthorized humanitarian intervention in recent history.”). 
32. See id. at 46–47; MALCOLM EVANS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 622 (2010). 
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infringement on state sovereignty that violated the UN Charter’s 
prohibition on the use of force.33  
Despite these arguments, the concept of a right of humanitarian 
intervention gradually gained traction in the international 
community. Some influential academics, notably Sir Christopher 
Greenwood, argued “modern customary international law recognizes a 
right of military intervention on humanitarian grounds by States, or 
an organization like NATO.”34 In support of his conclusions, Sir 
Christopher traced state practice back as far India’s intervention to 
end repression in Bangladesh.35 Others traced a customary 
international law right of humanitarian intervention back to 
Tanzania’s intervention to overthrow Idi Amin in Uganda and 
Vietnam’s use of force to end the rule of Pol Pot in Cambodia.36 
Supporters also contended that the historically selective use of 
humanitarian intervention did not disprove its existence, since 
humanitarian intervention was conceived as a right to intervene and 
not an obligation.37 Furthermore, even those instances of state 
practice that relied on self-defense as a justification for their actions, 
were, in reality, a form of humanitarian intervention.38 In Uganda, for 
instance, Tanzania did not merely repel attacks, but overthrew a 
repressive regime.39  
The arguments for and against the right of humanitarian 
intervention demonstrate the controversial nature of the concept 
within international law. Humanitarian intervention evolved from a 
once widely disregarded policy into a compelling justification for the 
use of force to prevent mass human rights violations. While 
humanitarian intervention’s status as a norm of customary 
international law remains contentious, state practice and opinio juris 
suggest that a strong argument can be made for the right’s legality. 
33. Ian Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN 
MODERN WORLD 217–28 (J.N. Moore ed., 1974). 
34. Greenwood, supra note 27, at 170. 
35. Id. at 163. 
36. See EVANS, supra note 32, at 621. 
37. See Holzgrefe, supra note 31, at 47 (arguing that the very nature of a 
right implies an element of selectivity concerning when it is applied, 
which is different from the obligation to act). 
38. See Greenwood, supra note 27, at 163. 
39. Id. 
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III. Emergence of the Responsibility to Protect 
Doctrine 
In the aftermath of Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo40 it was plain 
that the international community lacked an effective framework to 
prevent or stop mass atrocities. Consequently, in 2000, UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan asked: “[I]f humanitarian intervention is, indeed, 
an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a 
Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations of 
human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?”41  
In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS),42 an independent, Canadian-sponsored 
commission, responded by publishing a report “about the . . . ‘right of 
humanitarian intervention.’”43 Upon considering international law’s 
growing emphasis on protecting populations, the ICISS report 
concluded that the concept of state sovereignty, and our 
understanding of it, must entail a state’s responsibility to protect its 
own citizens.44 ICISS coined this proposal the responsibility to 
protect, or R2P.  
A. Content of the ICISS Report  
Following more than a year of research, interviews, and 
investigation,45 ICISS found that since the Peace of Westphalia,46 
international norms had shifted such that state sovereignty was no 
longer inviolate.47 In the twenty-first century, ICISS found sovereignty 
entailed responsibility: in particular, the responsibility to protect 
populations from mass human rights violations.48  
40. See KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 18. 
41. ICISS REPORT, supra note 11, at VII.  
42. See generally id. 
43. Id. at VII.  
44. Id. at XI.  
45. See Lloyd Axowrthy, RtoP and the Evolution of State Sovereignty, in 
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 3, 11 (Jared Genser and Irwin Cotler 
eds., 2012). 
46. The Peace of Westphalia was a treaty signed by the warring states of 
Europe in 1648. It is regarded as providing for the modern foundations 
of the system of international relations. See Treaty of Westphalia, THE 
AVALON PROJECT, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17thcentury 
/westphal.asp.  
47. ICISS REPORT, supra note 11, at XI.  
48. Id. at 32–33. In addition to atrocity crimes, ICISS also provided that:  
[Military] intervention for human protection purposes [is 
justified] . . . to halt or avert . . . situations of state collapse and 
481 
 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012 
Preventing Mass Atrocity Crimes 
As part of the responsibility to protect, ICISS proposed that 
states had three separate, but interlinked duties. First, individual 
states were primarily responsible for protecting their populations.49 
ICISS categorized this aspect of the R2P as a state’s “responsibility to 
prevent,” outlining a state’s obligation to eliminate the root causes of 
mass atrocities.50  
Second, ICISS found that where a state fails to protect its 
population—or is the driving force behind mass atrocities—the 
responsibility to protect shifts to the international community.51 
ICISS categorized this aspect of R2P as the “responsibility to react,” 
stating that in responding to mass atrocities, the international 
community must first exhaust peaceful options, following which force 
can be used in extreme circumstances.52  
Third, ICISS found that after the use of force to prevent mass 
atrocities, states should help post-conflict states rebuild. In doing so, 
ICISS held that states should provide full assistance to support 
recovery efforts, reconstruction, and reconciliation.53 ICISS framed 
this aspect of R2P as the “responsibility to rebuild,” making clear 
that when acting pursuant to its responsibility to rebuild, the 
international community should pay particular attention to 
addressing the causes of harm that an intervention was designed to 
halt or avert.54 
In reaching its conclusions, the ICISS report addressed two of 
international law’s most controversial questions: when could states 
use force to protect populations and which authorities would be 
competent to authorize it? ICISS first found that the international 
community could use force to prevent atrocities when attempts to 
resolve crises by peaceful options had been exhausted and the 
the resultant exposure of the population to mass starvation 
and/or civil war; and overwhelming natural or environmental 
catastrophes, where the state concerned is either unwilling or 
unable to cope, or call for assistance, and significant loss of life 
is occurring or threatened. 
 Id. at 32–36.  
49. Id. at XI. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 29. 
52. ICISS discussed the meaning of “extreme” stating that the use of force 
should be confined to “cases of violence which so genuinely ‘shock the 
conscience of mankind’ or which present clear and present danger to 
international security, that they require coercive military intervention.” 
Id. at 31. 
53. Id. at XI. 
54. Id. 
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circumstances faced by the international community were extreme.55 
To ensure these principles were adhered to, ICISS provided a six-part 
test for determining whether the use of force for humanitarian 
purposes is warranted.56 According to ICISS, for intervention to be 
legitimate: (1) just cause must exist; (2) the assistance must be 
provided as a last resort; (3) the acting states must have rightful 
intentions; (4) the action must be proportional to the humanitarian 
crisis; (5) the action must have a reasonable chance of success; and 
(6) the action must be authorized by a legitimate authority.57  
Regarding the competent authorities to authorize the use of force 
(for the purposes of protecting populations), ICISS found that the UN 
was the principal organization charged with the task.58 Presumably in 
recognition of the fact that there were likely to be future instances in 
which the Security Council would be deadlocked, as it had been 
throughout much of the 1990s, ICISS provided that when the Security 
Council fails to act, regional or sub-regional organizations could take 
collective action within their boundaries.59 Moreover, ICISS provided 
that a UN General Assembly Uniting for Peace Resolution could 
provide “a high degree of legitimacy for an intervention.”60  
B. UN Evolution of R2P  
Post-2001 and the ICISS report, the UN began to shape R2P. In 
doing so, the UN contributed to the doctrine’s codification and 
international acceptance, but its actions also marked a subtle shift 
away from the ICISS formulation of R2P. In particular, the UN did 
not endorse or build on the ICISS Report’s discussion of how the 
international community may respond to mass atrocities when the 
Security Council fails to act.61  
R2P first featured on the UN agenda in 2004 when a UN High-
level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change (UN High-level 
Panel) produced a report titled A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility.62 Pursuant to its mandate of generating new ideas 
about the policies and institutions required for the UN to be effective 
55. Id. at 31. 
56. See id. at 32–37. 
57. Id. at XII (applying the principles to “military interventions”). 
58. Id. at 53.  
59. See id. at 53–54. ICISS included regional coalitions as capable of taking 
collective intervention within the boundaries on the basis that member 
states to those organizations are more familiar with local political actors 
and are more likely to feel the impact of the human catastrophe.  
60. Id. at 53.  
61. See id. at 53–55. 
62. See A More Secure World, supra note 1. 
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in the twenty-first century,63 the UN High-level Panel went on to 
recognize the “emerging norm that there is a collective international 
responsibility to protect.”64  
It was not until the following year at the World Summit that the 
UN began to shape R2P. In September 2005, 170 heads of state65 
came together at the General Assembly to “take action on grave 
global threats that require bold global solutions.”66 This meeting 
produced the World Summit Outcome Document. The World Summit 
Document, at paragraphs 138 and 139, recognized each state’s 
responsibility to protect populations from mass atrocity crimes: 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing.67 
Importantly, in paragraphs 138 and 139, states recognized that they 
were “prepared”68 to take action to prevent mass atrocity crimes on a 
“case-by-case basis.”69 In making their findings, the World Summit 
63. See id. at 1.  
64. Id. at 66.  
65. William W. Burke-White, Adoption of the Responsibility to Protect, in 
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 17, 21 (Jared Genser and Irwin Cotler 
eds., 2012). 
66. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Address to the 2005 World Summit 
(Sept. 14, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/summit2005/ 
statements/sgenglish3.pdf 
67. For an overview of these crimes, see Tarun Chhabra and Jeremy B. 
Zucker, Defining the Crimes, in THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 37 
(Jared Genser and Irwin Cotler eds., 2012). 
68. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 139, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005). 
69. Id. ¶ ¶ 138–39. 
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, 
including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. 
We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The 
international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help 
States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in 
establishing an early warning capability. 
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the 
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other 
peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the 
Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared 
to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the 
Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter 
VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional 
organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and 
national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We 
stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of 
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noted that the protection of populations by the use of force was only 
available when authorized in accordance with the UN Charter’s 
Chapter VII framework.70  
In the wake of the UN General Assembly’s acceptance of R2P, the 
UN Security Council “reaffirmed” the doctrine in April 2006.71 
Specifically, the UN Security Council adopted paragraphs 138 and 139 
of the World Summit Document in its landmark Resolution 1674 on 
the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict.72 In endorsing the 
World Summit’s formulation of R2P, the Security Council confirmed 
the main protection responsibilities of R2P, also reaffirming the 
Security Council’s prerogative on the use of force.  
In 2009, the UN codification of R2P continued when UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon presented a report (Secretary-
General’s Report) clarifying R2P so that states could implement it in 
a “fully faithful and consistent manner.”73 According to the Secretary-
General’s Report, R2P should be understood as comprising three 
conceptual pillars.74 First, each state has the responsibility to provide 
security for their populations and protect them from genocide, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity.75 Second, when a state lacks the 
capacity to protect its populations from these crimes, the 
international community has the responsibility to provide assistance, 
helping states to meet their obligations.76 Third, if a state “manifestly 
the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, 
bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We 
also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to 
helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to 
assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break 
out. Id.  
70. Id.  
71. See S.C. Res. 1674, supra note 1 (“Reaffirm[ing] the provisions of 
paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document 
regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”). 
72. Id. Notably, the resolution was ultimately supported by Russia and 
China, each of whom had initially expressed reservations about the 
implications of Responsibility to Protect for state sovereignty. 
73. U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, ¶ 2, 
U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect]. At the subsequent General Assembly debate, 
over fifty states explicitly endorsed the Secretary-General’s three-pillar 
formulation.  
74. Id. ¶ 11.  
75. Id. ¶ 11(a). 
76. Id. ¶ 11(b). 
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fails” in its protection responsibilities, the international community 
should respond in a timely and decisive manner, by taking a range of 
peaceful, coercive, or forceful measures in accordance with the UN 
Charter.77 With time, the Secretary-General’s “three pillar” approach 
has become widely accepted, having been endorsed by more than fifty 
states.78 
IV. R2P’s Third Pillar and the Use of Force 
The use of force to protect populations is one of the most 
controversial issues in international law. In Bosnia and Rwanda, 
states and regional organizations failed to protect populations from 
mass atrocities. When states used force to end mass atrocities in 
Kosovo without Security Council authorization, however, their actions 
were viewed as controversial.79 With the rise of R2P, the international 
community was provided with a framework for preventing or halting 
the mass atrocity crimes that characterized these humanitarian 
tragedies. 
A. Pillar Three of the Responsibility to Protect 
R2P is primarily concerned with the prevention of atrocity crimes 
through peaceful means. In doing so, R2P respects the importance 
international law attaches to state sovereignty,80 while also providing 
a framework that regularizes the use of force to protect populations. 
Only in rare instances will R2P permit the international community 
to use force. In these circumstances R2P’s three-pillar framework 
ensures the international community will only use force when 
absolutely necessary. 
According to the Secretary-General’s Report, R2P’s third pillar 
requires that when a state has “manifestly failed” to protect its 
population, the international community should respond “in a timely 
and decisive manner,” through a “reasoned, calibrated and timely 
response” in accordance with the UN Charter.81 This formulation of 
77. Id. ¶ 11(c). 
78. See GLOBAL CENTER FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, 
IMPLEMENTING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE 2009 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE: AN ASSESSMENT 5–6 (Aug. 2009). 
79. See KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 18. 
80. See U.N. Charter art. 2 para. 7 (“Nothing contained in the present 
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters 
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or 
shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under 
the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the 
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”).  
81. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 73, ¶ 11.  
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R2P means that before the Security Council can authorize the use of 
force, peaceful and coercive, non-military options must have been 
exhausted. In practice, the exhaustion of peaceful measures means 
that the international community should first resort to diplomacy, 
attempt to secure ceasefires, impose sanctions, or refer the situation to 
the International Criminal Court (ICC), before authorizing the use of 
force. When turning to the question of authorizing the use of force to 
protect populations, the Secretary-General’s Report provides that 
military force can only be authorized through Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter.82 
B. Libya  
The March 2011, NATO led, intervention to prevent atrocity 
crimes being committed by the government of Libya against its own 
citizens marks the first major instance of Security Council practice 
under R2P’s third pillar.83 Following extensive human rights abuses 
and statements of intent to commit mass atrocities by Muammar 
Qaddafi,84 on February 26, 2011, the Security Council passed 
Resolution 197085 in an attempt to resolve the Libya crisis peacefully. 
The resolution cited the “Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect 
its population,”86 further referring the Libyan situation to the ICC 
and imposing an arms embargo, travel ban, and asset freeze on a 
number of specified individuals.87  
In the weeks that followed Resolution 1970, it became clear that 
Qaddafi had no intention of stopping his attacks and that if the 
international community was to successfully protect the Libyan 
population, stronger measures were required.88 As a result, on March 
2, 2011, the Security Council authorized all necessary measures to 
protect civilians and civilian-populated areas under threat of attack 
by Qaddafi forces.89 The authorization of the use of force resulted in a 
82. Id. ¶¶ 49–50. 
83. Responsibility to Protect: The Lessons of Libya, THE ECONOMIST, May 
19, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18709571. 
84. See The Crisis in Libya, INT’L COALITION FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/cris 
is-in-libya (last visited Mar. 6, 2013). 
85. Press Release, Security Council, In Swift, Decisive Action Security 
Council Imposes Tough Measures on Libyan Regime, Adopting 
Resolution 1970 in Wake of Crackdown on Protestors (Feb. 26, 2011), 
available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10187.doc.ht 
m. 
86. S.C. Res. 1970, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011). 
87. See id.  
88. The Crisis in Libya, supra note 84.  
89. S.C. Res. 1973, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). 
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NATO military campaign that disabled forces loyal to Qaddafi and 
brought an end to their attacks on civilians.90 
Resolution 1973 authorized the use of force in Libya on the basis 
of R2P’s third pillar. The Security Council explicitly invoked Libya’s 
failure to uphold its responsibility to protect its population as 
justification for Chapter VII intervention.91 Moreover, the Security 
Council issued Resolution 1973 following the exhaustion of peaceful 
means in Resolution 1970, acting in accordance with the R2P 
doctrine.92  
From the R2P perspective, the importance of Libya was threefold. 
First, Resolution 1973 reaffirmed pillars one and two of the doctrine. 
Resolution 1973 reiterated the responsibility of the Libyan authorities 
to protect its population, reaffirming that the parties to armed 
conflicts bear the primary responsibility of taking all feasible steps to 
ensure the protections of civilians.93  
Second, the Security Council authorized intervention in Libya 
demonstrates international law’s extension to allow the use of force in 
situations where atrocity crimes may occur, or are imminent; 
Resolution 1973 stated “that widespread and systematic attacks 
currently taking place in the Libya Arab Jamahiriya against the 
civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity.”94 
Third, intervention in Libya reaffirmed the Security Council’s 
belief that the protection of civilians and civilian populated areas is of 
fundamental importance to the international community. This is 
because Resolution 1973 expressed the Security Council’s 
“determination to ensure the protection of civilians and civilian 
populated areas.”95  
V. R2P and the Syria Crisis 
Despite its rapid development and use in Libya, the Syria crisis 
demonstrates that R2P is still missing a crucial component: what to 
do when the Security Council fails to act in the face of ongoing mass 
atrocity crimes. One argument is that nothing can be done; the 
Security Council must authorize any use of force under R2P and the 
stability of the international order requires so. This article argues that 
90. The Crisis in Libya, supra note 84.  
91. S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 89, pmbl. 
92. See id. (noting that Libyan authorities failed to comply with resolution 
1970). 
93. See id. 
94. Id. This standard of proof equates to a civil test of balance of 
probabilities and is contrasted with higher burdens of proof such as a 
“prima facie case” and “beyond reasonable doubt”. 
95. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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there is an alternative. In the face of Security Council inaction, a 
regional organization or coalition of the willing should be able to 
authorize and undertake the limited use of force to protect 
populations from mass atrocity crimes. The case of Syria indicates 
why such an evolution of the R2P doctrine is necessary, and how it 
might be applied in practice. 
In March 2013, after twenty-four months of conflict, the scale of 
the Syria crisis rivals the worst humanitarian tragedies of the past 
two decades.96 In August 2012, the UN Human Rights Council found 
that the Syria crisis was being driven by a “state policy” of deliberate 
attacks against civilians amounting to war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.97 Although Syria would appear to present a textbook case 
for Security Council action under its Chapter VII powers, Russia and 
China have vetoed three separate resolutions aimed at holding the 
Assad regime accountable. Although Russia claims that its opposition 
is grounded in concerns that R2P may be abused by powerful states, 
the real reason is likely strategic; Russia has close ties with the Syrian 
Government and an interest in maintaining the status quo. For 
instance, Syria hosts a significant Russian naval base at Tartus.98 
A. Preventing and Halting Atrocity Crimes When the Security Council 
Fails to Act  
Whether R2P’s third pillar should allow limited use of force when 
the Security Council fails to act is a complicated and delicate 
question. The international community is generally adverse to any use 
of force outside the Security Council;99 and it is a foundational 
principle of international law that the use of force should be avoided 
wherever possible.100 Moreover, any use of force without Security 
Council authorization raises concerns that powerful states could 
unnecessarily violate a weaker state’s sovereignty and that the 
importance the UN Charter attaches to state sovereignty may be 
undermined.101  
96. The crises in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Rwanda all involved mass atrocity 
crimes, though to be sure the death toll in Rwanda was far greater than 
in the Balkan conflicts or in Syria as of March 2013. In particular, 
several analysts have drawn parallels between Syria and Bosnia crises. 
See, e.g., Jackie Northam, Syrian Conflict a Haunting Reminder of 
Bosnia, NPR, June 23, 2012, http://www.npr.org/2012/06/23/155 
622562/syrian-conflict-a-haunting-reminder-of-bosnia. 
97. Report on Syrian Arab Republic, supra note 5, ¶¶ 50, 57. 
98. See Sharples, supra note 10. 
99. See U.N. Charter, art. 2 para. 4 (prohibiting the use of force against 
sovereign states). 
100. See id. art. 2 para. 7, art. 51.  
101. Mikulaschek, supra note 8, at 20, 24. 
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At the same time, the prohibition of mass atrocity crimes is now 
recognized as jus cogens,102 or fundamental to the international 
system. Such status in international law is vitally important, because 
it reminds the international community that it should prevent 
atrocity crimes wherever possible. Moreover, as Bosnia, Rwanda, 
Kosovo, Darfur, and now Syria demonstrate, the Security Council will 
not always act to prevent mass atrocities, either in a timely and 
decisive manner, or at all.  
When the Security Council fails to act, this article argues that 
R2P’s third pillar should allow a regional organization or coalition of 
the willing to authorize and undertake the limited use of force to 
protect populations from atrocity crimes. To mitigate concerns 
regarding state sovereignty and the use of force without Security 
Council authorization, R2P’s third pillar should only allow low-
intensity military operations in limited instances. The criteria that 
ensure this careful balance are outlined below:  
1.  A prima facie case must be established: Before force can be 
used to prevent or halt mass atrocity crimes, a prima facie 
case must be established that atrocity crimes are occurring 
(or about to occur). This prima facie case would need to be 
established using evidence gathered by neutral, 
internationally respected sources, such as the UN Human 
Rights Council, the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, or the International Criminal Court. This is now 
possible due to the development of international criminal 
law, which has codified the elements of atrocity crimes. 
2.  Peaceful options must be exhausted: Consistent with R2P’s 
second pillar, peaceful options for preventing or stopping 
the atrocity crimes—commencing with diplomacy and 
progressing to more coercive tactics such as sanctions—
must be exhausted before any low-intensity military 
options could be considered.  
3.  The Security Council must be unable to act: The Security 
Council must be unable to act effectively in the crisis. In 
practice, one or more of the Security Council’s five 
permanent members, each of which wield a veto, must 
have repeatedly blocked resolutions aimed at compelling 
the state in question to prevent or stop mass atrocity 
crimes and fulfill its responsibility to protect its 
102. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: 
The Need for Accountability, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 17 (1996) 
(noting that crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, and torture 
are international crimes rising to the level of jus cogens, and therefore, 
states have an obligation to extradite or prosecute suspected criminals). 
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population. Moreover, the prospects for effective Security 
Council action must be remote, i.e., because one or more 
permanent members have announced their intention to 
oppose any coercive measures against the state committing 
atrocities. 
4.  Any military force used must be limited to low-intensity 
options designed to protect populations: States would only 
be privileged to use low-intensity military options designed 
to protect populations, such as no-fly zones and 
humanitarian safe zones. Limiting military force in this 
way would help to ensure that states are acting out of the 
right intentions and using force that is proportional to 
achieving R2P’s humanitarian goals.  
5.  The use of low-intensity military force must be authorized 
by a legitimate authority: Consistent with the ICISS report, 
this article argues that the legitimate authority for a no-fly 
zone or humanitarian safe haven could come from a 
number of sources, including a broad international 
coalition, a regional political or security organization, or 
the UN General Assembly.  
6.  The intervention must come at the request of credible 
opposition groups: Implementing a no-fly zone or 
humanitarian zone within a sovereign state would also 
require a specific request for intervention from opposition 
groups that represent victims of atrocity crimes.  
B. Pillar Three of the Responsibility to Protect When the Security 
Council Fails to Act 
This article discusses each criterion below, describing the 
safeguards that ensure consistency with international law governing 
the use of force. Moreover, to illustrate how these criteria would apply 
in future instances of mass atrocities, this article uses the Syria crisis 
as a practical case study.  
1. A prima facie case must be established 
Before the international community can use low-intensity military 
options to protect populations, a prima facie case of ongoing mass 
atrocity crimes must be established.103 Prima facie here is used in the 
103. This view is supported by recent Security Council practice and academic 
opinion. When authorizing Chapter VII powers in UN Security Council 
Resolution 1973 (2011), war crimes had not been proven, therefore 
supporting the requirement of prima facie case only. For detailed 
academic discussion on the evidentiary standards required for R2P, see 
Stuart Ford, Is the Failure to Respond Appropriately to a Natural 
Disaster a Crime against Humanity? The Responsibility to Protect and 
491 
 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012 
Preventing Mass Atrocity Crimes 
strong sense of the common law concept; as described by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, a prima facie case constitutes evidence sufficient to 
create a “legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption” on the part of 
the opposing party.104 In the context of R2P, the prima facie case 
requirement would place the burden of proof on the international 
community,105 mitigating concerns about R2P’s abuse by self-
interested states. As the ICISS report noted, legitimate humanitarian 
interventions must have a “just cause,” which contemplates the use of 
force only in situations where large scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing 
were occurring or about to occur. Consistent with the ICISS report, a 
prima facie case requirement would also help to ensure that any use of 
force under R2P would be “to halt or avert human suffering.” 106  
A prima facie case of ongoing mass atrocity crimes need not be 
made in a formal court of law. Instead, international organizations, 
which are now capable of investigating mass atrocity crimes and 
making their findings publicly available, can provide an independent, 
transparent source of evidence. The UN Human Rights Council 
(UNHRC), an inter-governmental body of forty-seven states 
“responsible for the promotion and protection of all human rights 
around the globe,” can establish commissions of inquiry to determine 
the existence of atrocity crimes. The International Committee for the 
Red Cross (ICRC) now lists protecting civilians in armed conflicts as 
one of its primary objectives; its delegates visit conflict areas to 
ensure that “authorities and other constituted groups comply with 
their obligations under” international humanitarian and international 
human rights law.107 Similarly, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor has a 
dedicated investigations unit tasked with gathering possible evidence 
of atrocity crimes.108 Recognized experts, such as leading academics 
and former prosecutors, can also play a key role in evaluating whether 
atrocity crimes are occurring within a sovereign state.  
Individual Criminal Responsibility in the Aftermath of Cyclone Nagris, 
38 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 227, 240 (2010).  
104. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Aff. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 n.7 (1981).  
105. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.  
106. See ICISS REPORT, supra note 11, at XII. 
107. Protection of the Civilian Population, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS 
(Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.icrc.org/eng/what-we-do/protecting-civili 
ans/overview-protection-civilian-population.htm. 
108. Article 53 of the Rome Statute provides that before initiating an 
investigation, the prosecutor must determine whether “there is a 
reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation” by taking into 
account, inter alia, whether there is “a reasonable basis to believe that a 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed or is 
being committed.” Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
art. 53, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.  
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The international community would be able to ensure objectivity 
in this process because it now has clear, well-defined standards by 
which to determine whether a state is committing mass atrocity 
crimes. Amongst others, the International Criminal Tribunals for 
Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia and the ICC, including the Rome 
Statute that created it, constitute a robust jurisprudence that has 
codified the elements of atrocity crimes. 
In the case of Syria, a prima facie case would consist of well-
documented evidence from multiple independent sources that the 
Assad regime had intentionally committed mass atrocity crimes. The 
UNHRC has been actively involved in investigating mass atrocity 
crimes in Syria, and has established a Commission of Inquiry for this 
purpose. According to a February 2012 UNHRC Report, Assad’s 
security forces have committed “widespread, systematic, and gross 
human rights violations”109 by indiscriminately using heavy weapons, 
including tanks, artillery, and helicopter gunships, against civilians.110 
Additionally, the Report found that Syrian forces had deliberately 
shot civilians, shelled residential areas, and tortured hospitalized 
protesters.111 That Report also found that Assad’s security forces had 
summarily executed unarmed protesters, targeted women and children 
with snipers, and attacked residential areas with indiscriminate 
weapons such as mortars.112 Echoing the language of R2P’s third 
pillar, the Report concluded that Syria has “manifestly failed” to 
protect its own people.113  
The majority of these attacks, the UNHRC Report found, have 
been directed against unarmed civilians. In one such incident, on 
December 21, 2011, Syrian government forces “attacked a group of 
activists who had sought refuge in the village mosque. . . . After the 
forces withdrew, 60 bodies were discovered . . . the victims appeared 
to have been tortured before their execution.”114 Since the February 
2012 UNHRC Report was released, new atrocities have been reported 
on an almost daily basis. In the Houla region, Syrian militias aligned 
with the government, known as shabiha, executed over one hundred 
civilians, leading a number of western states to expel Syrian diplomats 
in protest.115    
109. Report on the Syrian Arab Republic, supra note 5, ¶ 2.  
110. See id. ¶¶ 39–46 (describing the tactics used by Syrian state forces). 
111. See id. 
112. See id. 
113. Id. ¶ 126. 
114. Id. ¶ 42. 
115. Houla: How a Massacre Unfolded, BBC, June 8, 2012, http://www.bbc. 
co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18233934. See also Martin Chulov, Houla 
Massacre: UN Resolution Condemns Syria, THE GUARDIAN (UK), June 
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In response to the widespread international condemnation over 
Houla,116 the Syrian government claimed that it was legitimately 
targeting “terrorists,” who were themselves responsible for the mass 
killings.117 Yet even when Syrian forces have attacked armed 
opposition forces, such as fighters from the Free Syria Army (FSA), 
they have done so in a way that also deliberately targets civilians in 
violation of international law. In December 2011, during a Syrian 
military operation in Bab Amr, Homs against the FSA, the February 
UN Report found that “[r]esidential buildings . . . were shelled by 
tanks and anti-aircraft guns,” and “[s]tate snipers also shot at and 
killed unarmed men, women, and children.”118 The February 2012 
UNHRC Report also found that defectors from the Syrian forces have 
been “summarily executed.”119 Evaluating these findings in their 
totality, the UNHRC concluded that the Syria crisis is being driven 
by a “state policy” of deliberate attacks against civilians amounting 
to war crimes and crimes against humanity.120 
In Syria, international experts have also contributed to building a 
prima facie case. Professor David Crane, former Chief Prosecutor to 
the Special Court of Sierra Leone, has led a team in writing a detailed 
report documenting the atrocities that have occurred in Syria since 
March 2011.121 Professor Crane’s report considers and analyzes reports 
from news agencies and NGOs, concluding that there is evidence to 
support an allegation that forty individuals within the Assad regime 
have committed crimes against humanity.122 Investigative reports by 
leading NGOs, such as a Human Rights Watch, reinforce Professor 
Crane’s conclusions.123  
1, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/01/syria-houla-ma 
ssacre-un-resolution. 
116. See, e.g., Philip Gourevich, What Has the Houla Massacre Changed?, 
THE NEW YORKER, May 29, 2012, http://www.newyorker.com/onlin 
e/blogs/newsdesk/2012/05/what-has-the-houla-massacre-changed.html. 
117. Security Council Debates Response to Houla, ALJAZEERA, May 27, 2012, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/05/2012527171046463
842.html. 
118. Report on Syrian Arab Republic, supra note 5, ¶ 43. 
119. Id. ¶ 40.  
120. Id. ¶¶ 50, 57. 
121. See Syracuse University College of Law, Report on the Syrian Crisis: 
Mapping Atrocity in Syria.  
122. See id. at 70.  
123. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THEY BURNED MY HEART (May 
2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/syria0 
512WebVersionReduced.pdf.  
494 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012 
Preventing Mass Atrocity Crimes 
As the Syria crisis illustrates, international criminal law has 
evolved in parallel with R2P.  There is now an international 
consensus, supported by the jurisprudence of the Rwanda and 
Yugoslav tribunals and codified in the ICC’s Rome Statute, regarding 
the elements of mass atrocity crimes. Moreover, the existence of mass 
atrocity crimes can now be independently evaluated and verified by 
neutral organizations, such as the UNHRC and the ICRC, which can 
be relied upon to document whether or not atrocity crimes are 
occurring and who might be responsible. In Syria, the UNHRC’s 
Commission of Inquiry concluded that the Assad regime is responsible 
for mass atrocity crimes. This conclusion has been reinforced by 
reports from independent experts and NGOs. The Syria crisis 
demonstrates that it is now possible for the international community 
to present a prima facie case, based on objective criteria, transparent 
methodology, and independent sources of evidence, that a sovereign 
state is committing atrocity crimes.  
2. Peaceful options must be exhausted 
After establishing a prima facie case of ongoing atrocity crimes, 
the international community must exhaust peaceful means to compel 
the state to stop committing mass atrocities. This requirement 
corresponds to the “last resort” principle endorsed by ICISS and the 
UN High-level Panel for determining whether the use of force for 
humanitarian purposes is warranted and justifiable. As the ICISS 
report noted, “every non-military option for the prevention or 
peaceful resolution of the crisis [must be] explored, with reasonable 
grounds for believing lesser measures would not have succeeded.”124 
Policymakers have a number of tools that do not involve the use 
of military force to incentivize a recalcitrant state to change its 
behavior. These run the gamut of statecraft, including diplomatic 
overtures (peace plans, ceasefires); political sanctions (severing 
diplomatic relations, imposing travel restrictions on particular 
individuals); and targeted economic sanctions (arms embargos, 
restrictions on oil exports). In general, the international community 
should start with diplomacy before resorting to more coercive 
measures. Still, policymakers should have some flexibility in this 
regard, since the appropriate amount of pressure to apply will 
inevitably depend on the sanctioned state’s behavior and particular 
facts of the crisis, as established by the prima facie case. 
The Syria crisis illustrates the extent to which the international 
community must exhaust peaceful options before low-intensity 
military options could be considered. In Syria, the international 
community has tried multiple rounds of regional and UN-brokered 
peace plans, and sanctions without success. In fact, the Assad 
124. ICISS REPORT, supra note 11, at XII. 
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regime’s attacks on civilians have intensified, with the regime 
increasingly relying on heavy military weapons such as cluster bombs 
and helicopter gunships. 
A series of international peace plans have failed to stop the Assad 
regime from committing mass atrocity crimes. In December 2011, the 
Syrian government signed a peace plan sponsored by the Arab 
League,125 agreeing to form a national unity government, hold 
elections,126 and allow Arab League monitors to enter the country. In 
the three weeks following the monitors’ arrival, however, more than 
400 people died, prompting the League to suspend its mission on 
January 28, 2012.127 The following month, the Arab League 
temporarily halted cooperation with the Syrian government after the 
government rejected an Arab League resolution calling for a joint 
Arab League-UN peacekeeping mission.128 On February 16, 2012, the 
UN General Assembly condemned “widespread and systematic 
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms by the Syrian 
authorities,” calling upon the government to implement the Arab 
League’s peace plans.129 
In March 2012, the Arab League and the UN renewed their efforts 
by jointly appointing Kofi Annan as the UN-Arab League Special 
Envoy to Syria. Annan produced a Six Point Plan for ending the 
conflict, supported by all members of the Security Council.130 Assad 
agreed to the Annan Plan, which required Syrian forces to withdraw 
from populated areas and imposed a ceasefire.131 On April 14, 2012, 
the Security Council subsequently adopted Resolution 2042, 
supporting the ceasefire and authorizing thirty unarmed observers to 
monitor implementation of the Annan Plan. A week later, the 
Security Council passed Resolution 2043, which established the UN 
125. Syrian Government Accepts Annan Peace Plan, BBC, Mar. 27, 2012, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17522398.  
126. Kareem Fahim, Arab League Proposes New Peace Plan for Syria, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 23, 2012, at A8. 
127. Colum Lynch, 400 Killed in Syria Since Arab League Monitors Arrived, 
U.N. Says, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost. 
com/2012-01-10/world/35438262_1_arab-league-french-ambassador-
gerard-araud-latakia; Arab League Suspends Syria Mission, BBC, Jan. 
28, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16774171.  
128. Syria Rejects New Arab League Peace Mission Proposal, BBC, Feb. 13, 
2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17008597. 
129. G.A. Res. 66/253, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/Res/66/253 (Feb. 21, 2012). 
130. Syria ‘Agrees’ to Peace Plan Deadline, Annan Tells UN, BBC, Apr. 2, 
2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17587438.  
131. Id. 
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Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), a ninety-day deployment of 
up to 300 additional unarmed military observers.132  
Similarly, sanctions have also been ineffective in pressuring the 
Assad regime to stop its attacks on civilians. The United States, 
European Union, and Arab League imposed extensive sanctions that 
restrict the travel and freeze the assets of Syrian officials,133 block the 
purchase of Syrian oil,134 and target Syrian information technology.135 
The EU has also imposed seventeen rounds of sanctions, targeting 
luxury items as well as goods and technologies that can be used for 
internal suppression.136  
3. The Security Council must be unable to act 
Before force can be used outside the Security Council, the 
international community must have repeatedly tried, and failed, to 
achieve consensus within it. Moreover, the prospects for any future 
Security Council action must be remote due to opposition by one of 
the Council’s Permanent Members.  By setting a high diplomatic 
threshold, this criterion ensures that the Security Council’s primary 
role in authorizing the use of force is respected. It also ensures that 
states cannot abuse R2P to bypass the Security Council and use force 
for their own aims.  
In Syria, for instance, the Security Council has failed to pass three 
strongly-worded resolutions authorizing peaceful measures to end the 
conflict due to open Russian and Chinese opposition. In October 2011, 
the first resolution threatened sanctions if the Syrian government did 
not immediately end violence against civilians.137 In February 2012, 
the second resolution did not threaten sanctions but called on Assad 
to leave office and supported the Arab League’s peace plan.138 In July 
132. S.C. Res 2042, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2043 (Apr. 21, 2012). 
133. Katherine Marsh, Syria Sanctions Declared as Violent Crackdown 
Continues, THE GUARDIAN (UK), May 6, 2011, http://www.guardian.co. 
uk/world/2011/may/06/syria-sanctions-crackdown-eu. 
134. See Report on Syrian Arab Republic, supra note 5, ¶ 34.  
135. Fact Sheet, U.S. Treasury Dep’t, Off. of Public Aff., New Executive 
Order Targeting Human Rights Abuses via Information Technology 
(Apr. 23, 2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/ 
sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Documents/ghravity_eo_fact_sheet.pdf. 
136. Stephen Castle, European Union Tightens Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, July 
24, 2012, at A8. 
137. Russia and China Veto UN Resolution Against Syrian Regime, THE 
GUARDIAN (UK), Oct. 4, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/ 
oct/05/russia-china-veto-syria-resolution. 
138. Paul Harris et al., Syrian Resolution Vetoed by Russia and China at 
United Nations, THE GUARDIAN (UK), Feb. 4, 2012, http://www.guardi 
an.co.uk/world/2012/feb/04/assad-obama-resign-un-resolution. 
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2012, Russia and China vetoed a United Kingdom-drafted resolution 
sponsored by the US, France, and Germany that threatened sanctions 
unless the Syrian government withdrew heavy weapons from 
populated areas within ten days.139 Even as the international 
community has seemingly abandoned efforts to stop the crisis through 
Security Council action, violence in Syria has continued to intensify.  
4. Military force must be limited to low-intensity options designed to 
protect populations 
Any use of force would be limited to low-intensity military 
options, such as the creation and enforcement of a no-fly zone or 
humanitarian safe zone. These options would satisfy both the “right 
intentions” and “proportionality” standards proposed by the ICISS 
report and the UN High-level Panel for the legitimate use of force for 
humanitarian purposes.140 Under the “right intentions” standard, 
states must be motivated by a desire to save civilian lives rather than 
self-interest.141 One test for “right intentions” is whether the military 
force is “directed against the territorial integrity or political 
independence” of the state.142 In addition, the military force used 
must be proportional to the humanitarian goal of protecting at-risk 
populations.143 During the 2003 Iraq war, for instance, the United 
States and its allies found wide support for no-fly zones to protect the 
139. Russia, China Veto Syria Resolution at U.N., THE WALL STREET 
JOURNAL, July 19, 2012, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
middle-east-18233934. 
140. See ICISS REPORT, supra note 11, at XII. Although these criteria were 
initially designed to test the legitimacy of the use of force with Security 
Council authorization, they can also be applied to the use of force 
without Security Council authorization. As discussed above, first two 
criteria—”just cause” and “last resort”—largely track the first two 
pillars of R2P Syria presents a “just cause” for intervention because the 
international community has established a prima facie case of ongoing 
mass atrocity crimes. The use of force in Syria would be a “last resort” 
because a succession of peace plans, ceasefires, and economic sanctions 
have not stopped the Assad regime from attacking civilians. 
141. Joyner, supra note 15, at 712. It is important that the intervening 
state/states not be perceived as acting primarily with an ulterior 
motive, using humanitarian interventions as a pretext for less legitimate 
motives such as revenge, power or land grabs, or strategic interests. See, 
e.g., INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: RESEARCH, 
BIBLIOGRAPHY, BACKGROUND 54–55 (Dec. 2001) (discussing how India’s 
1971 intervention in Pakistan was ill-received by the international 
community because India did not even claim humanitarian reasons as 
the primary justification for its intervention). 
142. Joyner, supra note 15, at 714. 
143. A More Secure World, supra note 1, ¶ 207(d).  
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Kurds, while the eventual invasion of Iraq to overthrow Saddam 
Hussein was met with considerable resistance from the international 
community.144  
In Syria, given the Assad regime’s use of air power against the 
civilian population, a no-fly zone—an area above Syria patrolled by 
the air forces of coalition of states —could be a proportional military 
response to the crisis.145 No-fly zones were a fixture during 1990s 
peacekeeping operations146 and were imposed on Iraq in 1991147 and in 
Bosnia in 1992.148 In 2011, the Security Council authorized a no-fly 
zone in Libya.149 There, as in Syria, the government used fighter jets 
and helicopter gunships against civilian protestors.150 States have 
sometimes been willing to establish no-fly zones in the past without 
Security Council authorization. In 1991, for instance, the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and France established a no-fly zone in 
Iraq in order to protect the Kurdish civilian areas, and did so without 
explicit Security Council authorization.151 The no-fly zone prevented 
Iraqi air forces from using Iraqi airspace,152 and commentators credit 
it with deterring further Iraqi aggression against the Kurdish 
population.153 
Humanitarian safe zones are another low-intensity military option 
consistent with right intentions and proportionality criteria. The 
purpose of a humanitarian zone is to shelter and protect civilian 
populations facing an imminent crisis or threat.154 Although 
humanitarian zones are often created without a state’s consent, their 
primary objective is to safeguard civilian populations. Like no-fly 
zones, however, humanitarian zones are generally ineffective unless 
144. See, e.g., Iraq War Legitimacy ‘Questionable,’ Says Ex-Diplomat, BBC, 
Nov. 29, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8382194.stm. 
145. Alexander Benard, Lessons From Iraq and Bosnia on the Theory and 
Practice of No-Fly Zones, 27 J. STRATEGIC STUD. 454, 455 (2004). 
146. Id. 
147. No-Fly Zones: The Legal Position, BBC, Feb. 19, 2001, http://news.bb 
c.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1175950.stm.  
148. S.C. Res 781, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/781, (Oct. 9, 1992). 
149. S.C. Res 1973, supra note 89, ¶ 6.  
150. Fresh Violence Rages in Libya, ALJAZEERA, Feb. 22, 2011, http:// 
www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/02/201122261251456133.html. 
151. See No-Fly Zones: The Legal Position, supra note 147.  
152. Operation Northern Watch, GLOBAL SECURITY, http://www.globalsecur 
ity.org/military/ops/northern_watch.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2013). 
153. Benard, supra note 145, at 465. 
154. See HIKARU YAMASHITA, HUMANITARIAN SPACE AND INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICS: THE CREATION OF SAFE AREAS 4 (2004). 
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there are armed forces with the authority and resources to protect 
them.  
The experience of the United States and its allies in Iraq, where 
they created a humanitarian zone in 1991 against the express wishes 
of the Iraqi government, demonstrate how effective these zones can be 
in protecting civilians. Saddam Hussein’s attacks on Kurdish 
populations in the north had led an estimated 1.5 million Kurds to 
flee their homes, with many heading towards Turkey and Iran.155 
Kurdish leaders appealed to France, Saudi Arabia, the UK, and the 
US, requesting immediate action by the UN. In early April, the 
Security Council passed Resolution 688 encouraging states “to 
contribute to . . . humanitarian relief efforts” and demanding that 
Iraq allow such efforts within the state.156  
The Iraqi government strongly opposed the plan for humanitarian 
zones, and said it would do everything in its power to prevent their 
creation. Nonetheless, in mid-April, coalition forces moved into 
northern Iraq with the express intention of setting up camps for 
Kurdish refugees and coordinating humanitarian aid.157 The zone 
lasted about three months and safeguarded some 450,000 Kurdish 
refugees before they were able to return home.158  
5. The use of low-intensity military force must be authorized by a 
legitimate authority 
When the Security Council fails to act to prevent or halt atrocity 
crimes, a legitimate authority must authorize any use of force.159 In 
accordance with earlier instances of humanitarian intervention 
without Security Council authorization,160 the legitimacy of an 
intervention will be greater where military action is undertaken by a 
155. Iraq Conflict History, INT’L CRISIS GRP., http://www.crisisgroup.org 
/en/publication-type/key-issues/research-resources/conflict-histories 
/iraq.aspx (last updated Jan. 2010). 
156. S.C. Res. 688, ¶¶ 2, 6 U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (Apr. 5, 1991). 
157. Peter Malanczuk, The Kurdish Crisis and Allied Intervention in the 
Aftermath of the Second Gulf War, 2 EUR. J. INT’L L. 114, 119–20 
(1991). 
158. Id. at 121. 
159. See, e.g., ICISS REPORT, supra note 11, at XII. 
160. The military intervention in Kosovo was led by NATO.  
500 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012 
Preventing Mass Atrocity Crimes 
regional security organization, a coalition of the willing,161 or some 
form of multilateral operations.162  
One possible basis for this authority would be a broad-based 
international coalition, including representatives from neighboring 
states.  A regional political or security organization, such as the 
European Union, the African Union, or the Arab League, could also 
legitimately authorize an R2P intervention. The ICISS report 
endorsed regional or sub-regional organizations pursuing collective 
action within their boundaries, on the basis that member states to 
those organizations are more familiar with local political actors and 
are more likely to bear the costs of any humanitarian crisis on their 
borders.163 Like the ICISS report, the UN High Level Panel also 
approved of the trend towards using regional coalitions to stop 
atrocity crimes.164 Another possible basis of authority would be the 
General Assembly’s “Uniting for Peace” procedure.165 
6. The intervention must come at the request of credible opposition 
groups 
An intervention taken pursuant to specific requests from victims’ 
representatives would also increase its perceived legitimacy and 
chances of success. In northern Iraq, for instance, leaders of the 
Kurdish community appealed to France, the UK, and the US to 
protect their people from Saddam Hussein;166 similarly, during the 
Kosovo crisis, the Kosovo Liberation Army requested help from the 
international community on numerous occasions.167 Both requests led 
161. For example, unilateral intervention by Vietnam in Cambodia in 1975 
was widely condemned because of the global distrust of communist 
governments at that time. See SEAN D. MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING WORLD ORDER 
104 (1996).  
162. Mikulaschek, supra note 8, at 24; Saban Kardas, Humanitarian 
Intervention: The Evolution of the Idea and Practice, PERCEPTIONS: J. 
INT’L AFF., Fall & Winter 2003, at 21.  
163. ICISS REPORT, supra note 11, at 53. 
164. A More Secure World, supra note 1, ¶ 272 (“Recent experience has 
demonstrated that regional organizations can be a vital part of the 
multilateral system. . . . The key is to organize regional action within 
the Charter and the purposes of the United Nations. . . .”) 
165. ICISS REPORT, supra note 11, at 53. 
166. Malanczuk, supra note 157, at 121. 
167. Carlotta Gall, Conflict in the Balkans: In Kosovo; Top Ethnic Albanian 
Rebel Asks NATO to Start Strikes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1999, http:// 
www.nytimes.com/1999/03/23/world/conflict-balkans-kosovo-top-eth 
nic-albanian-rebel-asks-nato-start-strikes.html?pagewanted=all&src= 
pm. 
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to international military interventions that were widely viewed as 
legitimate, despite the absence of Security Council authorization.  
Applying this criterion to Syria, a request for low-intensity 
military operations could come from a consensus among several 
groups representing victims of atrocity crimes, including the National 
Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (Syrian 
National Coalition) interim Prime Minister, Mr. Ghassan Hitto,168 
Local Coordinating Committees, Revolutionary Council, and the Free 
Syrian Army. To be sure, achieving consensus among opposition 
groups during a humanitarian crisis can be challenging. Syrian 
opposition groups initially disagreed about whether foreign military 
intervention was necessary or prudent,169 their views changed as the 
crisis intensified.170 
VI. Conclusion 
International law relating to the use of force to prevent atrocity 
crimes is still evolving. Even so, the R2P doctrine reflects a growing 
international consensus on several issues: (1) sovereignty entails the 
inherent responsibility to protect populations from mass atrocity 
crimes, the prohibition of which is fundamental to the international 
system; (2) the protection of populations from mass atrocities is 
primarily the responsibility of the state; (3) when a state is unable to 
prevent atrocity crimes from occurring, the international community 
should encourage and help that state to meet its sovereign 
obligations; (4) when a state manifestly fails to protect its population, 
the international community should first attempt to protect 
populations through peaceful means; and (5) once peaceful measures 
have been exhausted, the international community has the right to 
use force to bring an end to mass atrocities.  
Despite R2P’s important role in shaping the international 
community’s responses to mass atrocities, the doctrine has limitations. 
As the Syria crisis demonstrates, instances of mass human rights 
violations reminiscent of Bosnia and Rwanda still persist, largely 
because of Security Council inaction. As a result, the international 
168. The United States, United Kingdom, France, Turkey, and Gulf States 
have recognized the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and 
Opposition Forces as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people. 
See US Recognises Syria Opposition Coalition Says Obama, BBC, Dec. 
12, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-20690148. 
169. Randa Slim, Meet the Syrian Opposition, FOREIGN POL’Y, Nov. 1, 2011, 
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/02/meet_syrias 
_opposition. 
170. See, e.g., Syria Rebel Leader Wants Libyan-style Arab Initiative, 
REUTERS, Sept. 19, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/19 
/us-syria-sieda-libya-idUSBRE88I0H020120919 
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community must now ask what happens when the Security Council 
fails to act. In answering this delicate question, this article has argued 
that R2P’s third pillar should allow a regional organization or 
coalition of the willing to authorize, and use, limited military force to 
protect populations from mass atrocity crimes. To balance 
countervailing concerns, this article has proposed a framework for the 
use of limited military force under R2P’s third pillar when the 
Security Council fails to act. These criteria have attempted to 
reconcile the jus cogens status of the prohibition of atrocity crimes, 
with the importance that international law attaches to both state 
sovereignty and the UN Charter’s general prohibition on the use of 
force.  
First, a prima facie case of atrocity crimes must exist. Second, 
peaceful options to compel the state to protect its populations, such 
as diplomatic pressure and sanctions, must be exhausted, ensuring 
that force is used only as a last resort. Third, the Security Council 
must be unable to act because of repeated vetoes and continued 
opposition by permanent members. Fourth, any military force used 
must be limited to only those low-intensity options designed to 
protect populations, such as no-fly zones and humanitarian safe zones. 
Fifth, force must be authorized by a legitimate authority, which could 
come from a broad international coalition, a regional political or 
security organization, or the UN General Assembly. Sixth, the 
intervention must come at the request of credible opposition groups 
that represent the victims of mass atrocity crimes.  
Over the past decade, R2P has made significant contributions to 
the protection of populations from mass atrocities. The doctrine has 
tackled, and engendered consensus on, some of international law’s 
most difficult and controversial questions regarding the use of force. 
In doing so, R2P has pushed debates forward in important ways. 
While these developments should be applauded, the next phase of 
R2P’s development must critically reflect, and as the framers of R2P 
once did, build consensus around some of the most controversial and 
complex issues of present-day international law. By establishing 
specific criteria that allow for the limited use of force when the 
Security Council fails to act, R2P would enable the international 
community to prevent the next Rwanda or Srebrenica. 
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